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Abstract: A common view among nontheists combines the de jure objection that 
theism is epistemically unacceptable with agnosticism about the de facto objection 
that theism is false. Following Plantinga, we can call this a “proper” de jure 
objection—a de jure objection that does not depend on any de facto objection. In 
his Warranted Christian Belief, Plantinga has produced general arguments against 
all proper de jure objections. Here I first show that this argument is logically 
fallacious (it makes subtle probabilistic fallacies disguised by scope ambiguities), 





   Theism is often the target of two main objections: (i) the de facto objection, according to 
which theism is false and (ii) the de jure objection, according to which theism is, for some 
relevant group of persons (e.g., typical, reasonably well-educated adult human beings in the 
contemporary world), unreasonable, irrational, unjustified, evidentially unsupported, or in some 
other way epistemically unsatisfactory.2 These two objections are prima facie independent of one 
another—independent in the sense that the success of one would not guarantee (or make 
probable) the success of the other. And if they are indeed independent of one another in this 
sense, this fact would seem to be of significant benefit to nontheists, including both atheists and 
agnostics. It would benefit agnostics by making it possible for them to consistently endorse the 
de jure objection (thereby supporting their position over theism) without simultaneously 
committing themselves to the success of the de facto objection (thereby maintaining their 
distance from atheism). Of course, this benefit would not accrue to atheists, since they, unlike 
agnostics, will need to endorse the de facto objection whether or not they also endorse the de jure 
objection. However, independence would benefit atheists for at least two other reasons: first, it 
legitimates a bracketing strategy whereby the de facto objection is set aside in order to focus 
exclusively on the de jure objection for those who might be more likely convinced by the latter 
than the former; second, having two good independent objections to a competing view on any 
issue is preferable to having just one.   
 
Theists, of course, would like to dispense will all objections to theism. It would appear to 
be a significant step in this direction if one could reduce the two major classes of objections to a 
single class by establishing that the de jure objection would have to be dependent on the de facto 
objection, i.e., that there can be no proper de jure objections to theism, thereby precluding the 
aforementioned benefits of independence from accruing to nontheism. My primary aim in this 
paper is to establish that this strategy fails. For the most part, I will focus specifically on the 
arguments in Plantinga’s Warranted Christian Belief (hereafter WCB), since it is there that 
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Plantinga originally devises the strategy in question (in terms of Christian belief as the particular 
type of theism and warrant as the particular type of positive epistemic status) and provides the 
only sustained defense of it to date. I will argue that one version of Plantinga’s widely discussed 
argument has gone largely ignored in the literature and potentially bypasses the existing 
objections to the other versions. But I will also argue that once we resolve various ambiguities in 
the argument, it can be proven fallacious on purely formal, probabilistic grounds. After removing 
this major roadblock to the possibility of proper de jure objections, it is still up to nontheists to 
actually provide such objections. I will end by laying the groundwork for proceeding with this 
project. In particular, I will outline various available strategies, discuss their comparative 
promise, make some concrete proposals, and address final objections. 
 
2. Plantinga’s Arguments and Unsatisfactory Objections  
 
For those unfamiliar with Plantinga’s WCB, a brief overview will be helpful. After setting 
up the book’s central questions in the preface and spending Part I on clearing away preliminary 
objections to there being a “sensible” de jure question about theistic belief to be asked in the first 
place (one that is coherent and not worthy of immediate dismissal), Plantinga devotes Part II to a 
survey of the various potential types of positive epistemic status in terms of which the de jure 
objection might be interpreted. He considers various types of rationality and justification, 
dismissing each as making for a poor version of the objection, until in the last chapter of the 
section he finally arrives at his own preferred interpretation in terms of warrant, which Plantinga 
defines as “that further quality or quantity (perhaps it comes in degrees), whatever precisely it 
may be, enough of which distinguishes knowledge from mere true belief” (153).3 At that stage, 
Plantinga outlines and tweaks the proper-functionalist account of warrant developed and 
defended in his two previous books in the trilogy of which WCB is the third (though the details 
of this account of warrant need not concern us here). With a full understanding of the de jure 
objection in hand, Part III develops and defends the coherence of a model of theistic (and 
specifically Christian) belief formation and regulation, built on Biblical scripture, as well as on 
the work of Aquinas and Calvin—a model which, together with his account of warrant, implies 
(or makes probable) that theistic (specifically Christian) belief is warranted, at least if there are 
no convincing defeaters for it.4 Plantinga then spends Part IV, the final part of the book, 
responding to alleged defeaters for theistic (Christian) belief. If successful, it follows that if 
theistic (Christian) belief is true, then it is probably warranted. Call this conditional the Bridge 
Claim, since it claims to bridge the gap between the ontological claim that God exists (or that 
Christianity is true) and the epistemological claim that theism (or some specific version thereof) 
is warranted. If the Bridge Claim correct, it supposedly follows that the denial of its consequent 
(which is to be equated with the only sensible understanding of the de jure objection) implies the 
denial of its antecedent (which is to be equated with the de facto objection). Hence, the de jure 
objection (at least any sensible version of it) entails the de facto objection. In other words, there 
is no such thing as a successful proper de jure objection.  
 
This argument has a number of potential vulnerabilities. It is possible to resist by 
claiming that Plantinga’s discussion of the various possible interpretations of the de jure 
objection overlooks some legitimate interpretations.5 It is possible to agree that the de jure 
objection is best understood in terms of warrant yet deny Plantinga’s proper-functionalist 
account of it, on which he relies to argue that the Aquinas/Calvin model entails (or makes 
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probable) that Christian belief is (probably) warranted if true, which in turn is needed to establish 
the Bridge Claim (or the Christian version of it).6 It is possible to accept Plantinga’s account of 
warrant yet reject the Aquinas/Calvin model.7 Even granting Plantinga everything up to and 
including the Aquinas/Calvin model, it is still possible to accept that theism (Christian belief) is 
probably warranted in the absence of defeaters but maintain that plausible defeaters exist (either 
because Plantinga skipped over some worthy candidates or gave fallacious reasons for 
dismissing the defeaters he did discuss).8   
 
I think there is something to all of these criticisms. However, they are ultimately 
unsatisfactory in the sense that Plantinga’s argument generalizes in a way that bypasses them 
entirely. In fact, Plantinga himself suggests such a generalization (2003: 186-191). He points out 
that if God exists and created us in his image and loves us and desires us to know him and so on, 
then he would want theism (at least for certain theists, e.g., Christians or some subset thereof) to 
be warranted, and being all-powerful, could make that happen. So, if theism is true, it is 
warranted (at least for some special group of theists). To argue that theism is unwarranted is in 
effect to argue that theism is false. Hence, any warrant version of the de jure criticism entails the 
de facto objection. This version of the argument does not depend on Plantinga’s specific account 
of warrant. Neither does it depend on the Aquinas/Calvin model. Moreover, it is plausible that 
the argument can be further generalized to eliminate the exclusive focus on warrant simply by 
replacing “warrant” with “positive epistemic status” throughout, leaving it open to 
interpretation.9 I’ll call this more general version of Plantinga’s argument the “Generalized 
Reduction Argument” (since it purports to reduce the de jure criticism to the de facto criticism).  
 
Even the Generalized Reduction Argument remains vulnerable to a different sort of 
objection—namely, the objection that a positive epistemic status for theism is something that 
God does not have the ability to guarantee without thereby interfering with the something of 
equal or greater value, such as free will or faith.10 Whether this type of objection succeeds 
depends on several highly contentious matters, such as the nature and value of free will and faith, 
how such values stack up against the allegedly competing value of positive epistemic status, and 
the scope of omnipotence. I think most of us can agree that the objection has enough potential to 
at least justify a hedge in the Bridge Claim: if God exists, then theism probably has positive 
epistemic status (for the relevant group of theists). In fact, Plantinga himself adds this hedge, 
though for reasons peculiar to his understanding of positive epistemic status in terms of warrant 
in combination with his account of warrant. But the issues here (free will, the value of faith, the 
scope of omniscience, etc.) are too controversial to convince all parties to the discussion to go 
further than a mere hedge by opting for an outright denial of (or even agnosticism with respect 
to) the Bridge Claim. Ideally, a stronger objection would bypass such controversial matters. And 
this stronger sort of objection is precisely what I intend to provide. I will argue that the flaw in 
the Generalized Reduction Argument runs deeper—at a logical level. Specifically, the argument 
makes a fallacious probability inference subtly disguised by a scope ambiguity in the Bridge 
Claim.   
 
3. An Analysis of Plantinga’s Logic 
  
Begin with a closer look at the logic of the Generalized Reduction Argument. Here’s a 




The Generalized Reduction Argument (Informal Version) 
 
P1. The Bridge Claim: If theism (or some specific version thereof) is true, then it 
probably has positive epistemic status (for some relevant group of individuals).  
P2. The De Jure Objection: Theism (or whatever version of it is specified in the Bridge 
Claim) does not have positive epistemic status (for the relevant group).  
∴ C.   The De Facto Objection: Theism is false.   
 
The logic of this informal version is puzzling. First, note that the Bridge Claim includes a 
probability qualification. This is because Plantinga admits that there is at least some very small 
chance that theism fails to be warranted given God’s existence. Second, note that there is no 
probability qualification in P2. This means that P2 is not quite the consequent of P1. Nor does P2 
entail the consequent of P1, since contingent claims, such as the claim that theism is warranted, 
can be probable yet turn out to be false. In fact, for this same reason, the premises are consistent 
with the falsity of the conclusion and the argument is therefore deductively invalid. Of course, 
we could interpret it as an inductive argument, but it will do just as well to keep it deductive and 
add a probability qualification to P2, since the de jure arguer had better not claim P2 with 
certainty anyway.   
 
 Now, once we add a probability operator to P2, this invites the question of whether the 
negation in P2 should take wide or narrow scope. In order to see the distinction, it will help to 
introduce some symbolization. First, let S be the proposition that theism has some particular 
positive epistemic status for some specified group, and let P[x] be the probability of any 
proposition x. Let’s also agree to express the claim that x is probable as the claim that P[x] > 
P[~x], which is equivalent to the claim that P[x] > ½. (However, if you prefer, you are welcome 
to replace P[x] > P[~x] and P[x] > ½ with P[x] >> P[~x] and P[x] >> ½.11)  Given these 
stipulations, we have the choice between revising (2) to say that P[~S] > ½ or to say that ~(P[S] 
> ½). But note that the latter is not strong enough to plausibly count as a de jure objection. It 
simply says that S isn’t probable, which leaves open the possibility that S isn’t improbable either, 
whereas the de jure arguer wants to say more strongly that theism does not have positive 
epistemic status, or at least probably does not. So, P[~S] > ½ is the better choice.  
 
 To complete our symbolization of the Generalized Reduction Argument, let G be the 
proposition that God exists (and let’s use the wedge “v” for inclusive disjunction, the tilde “~” 
for negation, and the arrow “→” for the ordinary English indicative conditional). We then get the 
following: 
 
The Generalized Reduction Argument (Narrow Scope Reading) 
 
P1. G→(P[S] > ½) 
P2. P[~S] > ½ 
∴ C.   ~G 
 
This is not quite an instance of modus tollens, since the second premise is not identical to the 
denial of the consequent of the first premise. However, the second premise does entail the denial 
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of the consequent. So, we still get a valid argument. Unfortunately, it isn’t the only possible 
interpretation. The problem is that the language Plantinga uses to express the Bridge Claim is 
ambiguous. In cases in which an English sentence contains an operator (such as the probability 
operator) in the consequent of what appears to be a conditional, the sentence is often ambiguous 
between a wide and narrow scope reading. So, it is somewhat unclear whether Plantinga really 
intended to assert a conditional with a probability operator in the consequent, or the probability 
of an entire conditional. In our symbolization, the ambiguity is between G→P[S] > ½ (as we 
have it in the narrow scope reading of the Generalized Reduction Argument) and P[G→S] > ½. 
However, if we instead adopt this alternative interpretation of the Bridge Claim, G is now in the 
scope of the probability operator, which means that we can only get a good inference if we revise 
the conclusion by placing G within the scope of the probability operator there as well. But since 
a negation is involved, we again have a choice between P[~G] > ½ and ~(P[G] > ½). However, 
only the former expresses a genuine de facto objection. So, our second potential interpretation of 
the Generalized Reduction Argument is as follows: 
 
The Generalized Reduction Argument (Wide Scope Reading)  
 
 P1. P[G→S] > ½  
 P2. P[~S] > ½ 
∴ C.  P[~G] > ½ 
 
Unfortunately, there is another ambiguity in Plantinga. Although in some places 
Plantinga uses “if.., then…” language to express the Bridge Claim, which suggests an indicative 
conditional (whatever the scope of the probability operator), whereas in other places he instead 
uses “given that” language, which in probabilistic contexts usually expresses conditional 
(relative) probability—the probability of some proposition x given (or on, or relative to) some 
proposition y, written P[x|y], as opposed to the absolute (i.e., nonconditional or nonrelative) 
probability of x, which does not take its relation to y into account. So, perhaps the Bridge Claim 
does not involve an indicative conditional at all. Perhaps we should interpret it as a claim about a 
conditional probability (P[S|G]) rather than as a claim about the absolute probability of the 
corresponding conditional (P[G→S]). If so, this yields a third interpretation of the Generalized 
Reduction Argument:  
 
The Generalized Reduction Argument (Conditionalized Reading) 
 
P1. P[S|G] > ½  
P2. P[~S] > ½ 
∴ C.   P[~G] > ½ 
 
 Now that we’ve sorted out the structural ambiguities, there are other interpretational 
issues to address before we can proceed to the evaluatory stage.  
 
First, there is the question of how to understand the claim that God exists, primarily 
dependent upon which conception of God we adopt. Popular among philosophers is the 
Anselmian conception, according to which God is a perfect being.12 Plantinga himself seems to 
opt for the strong version of this, according to which God exists necessarily, if at all, and 
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possesses his perfections essentially.13 We will keep this strong Anselmian conception in mind in 
what follows, but will not restrict ourselves to it.  
 
  Second, there is also the question of how to interpret the probability operator.14 
Probabilities can be divided into three kinds: (i) objective probability (which measures certain 
features of the mind-independent world), (ii) epistemic probability (which measures the strength 
to which a given person possesses a given epistemic status toward a given proposition), and (iii) 
subjective probability (which measures a person’s credences, i.e., degrees of belief or levels of 
confidence). There are also various views about how each kind of probability is fixed, e.g., by 
some frequency (whether actual or hypothetical), the mathematical limit of some sequence of 
hypothetical frequencies, propensity, causal laws, modality, or some other standard. For what it’s 
worth, Plantinga explicitly indicates that his intended interpretation of probability in the context 
of the Generalized Reduction Argument is epistemic (2003: 190). But to preempt potential 
confusion here, it should be added that, although in the same passage Plantinga also appeals to 
objective probability (for which he maintains a modal view (2003: 188)), this is only because his 
account of epistemic probability is cashed out in terms of his proper-functionalist account of 
warrant (1993: Chapters 8 and 9), according to which warrant requires reliability in (the relevant 
segment of) our belief-forming faculties (when operating in the environment for which they are 
designed), and Plantinga in turn understands such reliability in terms of objective probability. So, 
ultimately, Plantinga’s concern is with epistemic probability, though objective probability plays 
a role. It will be helpful to keep this in mind as we proceed. However, there will be no need to 
restrict ourselves to any particular interpretation of probability, as we shall see.  
 
Although I will not presuppose any particular interpretation of probability, I will assume 
that the probability operator obeys the standard probability calculus. This is relatively 
uncontroversial for objective probability. But it is questionable given an epistemic or subjective 
interpretation, since agents can fail (even rationally) to notice certain logical inconsistencies or 
logical deductions that the standard probability calculus reflects. However, we can at least 
assume the standard laws of mathematical probability capture probability for agents who are 
sufficiently logically competent. Given this point, which Plantinga himself makes elsewhere 
(1993: 173), my argument will still show that sufficiently logically competent de jure arguers 
can consistently agree with the Bridge Claim and simultaneously refuse the de facto objection. 
Although my argument may not apply to de jure arguers who are logically incompetent in some 
respect, it should already be clear that there is some sense in which such agents can be consistent 
in agreeing to the Bridge Claim yet refusing the de facto objection precisely due to their logical 
incompetence.15 In any case, sufficiently logically competent de jure arguers are probably the 
only ones theists are (or should be) worried about anyway.  
 
As part of the standard probability calculus, I’ll be assuming the so-called Ratio Formula, 
which gives us the classical means by which to relate conditional probabilities to corresponding 
absolute probabilities: 
 





Although this formula is no longer universally accepted (see Hajek 2003), there are several 
things to be said in favor of adopting it here. First, my own view is that the standard justifications 
for the formula (which can be found in most decent probability primers) are convincing (at least 
given my earlier idealized assumption of agential logical competence), whereas the arguments 
against it are either fallacious or infringe upon idealization. But I cannot take the time to press 
these points here. More important for current purposes is that Plantinga himself seems to accept 
the formula (see, for example, Plantinga (2000: 231), where he simply stipulates the Ratio 
Formula as the definition of conditional probability).17 In any case, the Ratio Formula turns out 
to be a necessary assumption for the conditionalized reading of the Generalized Reduction 
Argument to get off the ground. Those who deny the Ratio Formula do not offer an alternative 
formula. They instead view P[x|y] as primitive, not calculable in terms of absolute probabilities. 
So, on their view, there is no systematic means by which to relate P[S|G] to P[~G] and P[~S], 
and therefore no reliable way to determine whether the narrow scope reading is valid.18  
 
Also as part of the backdrop of the standard probability calculus, I will be assuming 
classical logic, in particular the Law of Excluded Middle and the Law of Noncontradiction. If we 
were to abandon these assumptions, we’d need to adjust the probability calculus in various ways 
(e.g., to allow nonzero probabilities for contradictions and nonmaximal probabilities for 
disjunctions of contradictories). While this might be troublesome in certain contexts (though I 
doubt it), it seems no harm here, since the usual motivations for denying classical logic 
(stemming from alleged paradoxes, future contingent propositions, and the like) don’t seem to 
apply to propositions like S or G or logical constructions thereof. More substantively, by 
endorsing classical logic, I also mean to adopt its usual treatment of the indicative conditional: 
  
The Horseshoe Analysis: For all propositions, x and y, the indicative conditional, x→y, 
is truth-functionally equivalent to the corresponding material conditional, x ⊃ y, which is 
defined as ~x v y.19 
  
At this point matters become contentious, since the Horseshoe Analysis is controversial. 
However, as with the previous assumptions, there are several things to be said in favor of 
adopting it here. For one, I think that the analysis is true (though not adequately defended in the 
existing literature).20 But again, I won’t try to press this point here. Second, although I cannot 
find in print any clear indication that Plantinga agrees, I also cannot find any reason to think that 
he disagrees. Third, and most important here, if we do not adopt the Horseshoe Analysis, the 
wide and narrow scope versions of the Generalized Reduction Argument run into immediate 
trouble. They do not get footing unless we have a reliable means to determine how the absolute 
probability of a conditional relates to the absolute probabilities of its antecedent and consequent. 
(This is obvious for the wide scope reading, but we shall see later that it is likewise necessary for 
the narrow scope reading.) The Horseshoe Analysis gives us such a means, unlike any plausible 
alternative analysis. This is to be expected, since those who deny the Horseshoe Analysis deny 
that the indicative conditional is truth-functional, and if we cannot determine the truth value of 
the indicative conditional by determining the truth values of its antecedent and consequent, then 
it is hard to see how we could determine how likely the conditional is to be true by determining 




There is one prominent thesis in the literature on conditionals that might initially appear 
to bypass this problem. Whereas some alternatives to the Horseshoe Analysis propose a non-
truth-functional set of truth conditions (e.g., by going modal), there is one alternative that refuses 
to give any such conditions. It simply gives a probabilistic condition for the degree of 
acceptability of a conditional (where probability is to be understood as subjective or epistemic):  
 
The Formalized Ramsey Thesis: P(x→y) = P[y|x], for all x and y such that P[x] ≠ 0.21  
 
If we combine this with the Ratio Formula, then by the Transitivity of Identity, we get the 
following result: 
 
The Ramsified Ratio Formula: P[x→y] = P[x&y]/P[y], for all x and y such that P[x] ≠ 
0.   
 
We could then perform the necessary calculations to evaluate the wide scope and conditionalized 
readings of the Generalized Reduction Argument. But there are intractable problems for this 
approach. First, the triviality proofs of Hajek (1989 and 1994) (building on earlier triviality 
proofs of Lewis 1976, Stalnaker 1976, and Carlstrom and Hill 1978, et al.), convincingly show 
that the Ramsified Ratio Formula cannot be true as long as we take indicative conditionals to be 
propositions (i.e., bearers of truth). This has led some (e.g., Bennett 2003) to keep the Ramsified 
Ratio Formula and opt for Adams’s NTV (“No Truth Value”) theory (1975: 1-42; 1981), 
according to which indicative conditionals lack truth values (despite having probabilities).22 But 
those like me who find this implausible are forced to reject the Ramsified Ratio Formula (and 
therefore reject either the Formalized Ramsey Thesis or the Ratio Formula). Even if we accept 
the Ramsified Ratio Formula, the wide scope reading of the Generalized Reduction Argument 
collapses into the conditionalized reading, and the former will therefore inherit all of the 
problems I will later raise for the latter.23 The narrow scope reading will not similarly collapse, 
but there I will show that the criticisms I shall offer using the Horseshoe Analysis apply equally 
well if we drop the analysis and instead adopt the Ramsified Ratio Formula.  
 
 This shows that the assumptions I have outlined above, though controversial, are well 
motivated in the current context: if they fail, Plantinga’s logic is already unconvincing for other 
reasons. So, I shall hereafter take these assumptions for granted.   
 
4. A Critique of Plantinga’s Logic 
 
 Supposing that the above three formal interpretations of the Generalized Reduction 
Argument are the only three plausible disambiguations of the informal version, I will now argue 
that there is no interpretation on which the Generalized Reduction Argument is convincing 
(given the assumptions developed in the previous section). I will take the interpretations in 
reverse order, since the latter two are easiest to refute.     
 
4.1 Critique of the Conditionalized Reading 
 
On the conditionalized reading of the Generalized Reduction Argument, the inference is 
to P[~G] > ½ from P[S|G] > ½ and P[~S] > ½. However, assuming the standard mathematical 
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laws for probability operators, we can easily demonstrate that the inference is invalid. To prove 
this, we need to show that there are possible values for P[S|G] and P[~S] greater than ½ that are 
consistent with ~(P[~G] > ½), i.e., consistent with P[G] ≥ ½. For example, let P[~S] = 5⁄9 and 
P[S|G] = 7⁄9. Now we can calculate P[G] to prove that it’s ≥ ½. To do so, we will also need a 
value for P[S&G]. It will be consistent with our stipulations as long as it takes a value 0 ≤ 
P[S&G] ≤ P[S] and 0 ≤ P[S&G] ≤ P[G]. It will do to suppose that P[S&G] = 7⁄18. Then P[G] = 
P[S&G]/ P[S|G] = (7⁄18)/(7⁄9) = ½.  
 
In order to resist this argument, one will need to hold that, even though the general 
argument form of the conditionalized reading is invalid, it nevertheless holds for propositions of 
a certain kind, among which are S and G. I can only think of two ways in which this might be 
argued.  
 
First, one might argue that P[S|G] = 7⁄9 is too low. In fact, if we increase it slightly to 
P[S|G] = 8⁄9, then P[G] = P[S&G]/ P[S|G] = (7⁄18)/(8⁄9) = 7⁄16 < ½, yielding Plantinga’s conclusion. 
However, the problem with this type of strategy is the coarseness of our probabilistic judgments 
on topics such as this. They are not so precise as to discriminate between 7⁄9 and 8⁄9.  
 
Second, on modal understandings of probability, necessary propositions have probability 
1 and their negations have probability 0.24 Suppose we combine such a view with a strong 
Anselmian conception of God, according to which God is essentially perfect and necessarily 
exists, if at all. On this combination of views, it turns out that P[G] = 0 or 1; it cannot possibly 
take any intermediate value. In particular, it cannot possibly be ½—the value I earlier proved it 
would take if my starting values for P[~S], P[S|G], and P[S&G] were correct. So, those starting 
values are impossible and the proof does not succeed.25  
 
There are three plausible responses to this objection. First, the de jure arguer need not 
commit to the strong Anselmian conception. Second, the de jure arguer need not commit to a 
modal interpretation of probability. In fact, Plantinga’s aim is to undercut all proper de jure 
arguments, not just those proposed by strong Anselmians with a modal understanding of 
probability. So, I will hereafter assume that we can allow 0 < P[G] < 1 as a possible value in de 
jure arguments. In any case, even if we cannot make sense of P[G] = ½, we can still make sense 
of neutrality about whether P[G] = 0 or 1. This leads us to our third and final response. Suppose 
we grant a modal interpretation of probability and the strong Anselmian conception. On this 
combination of views, Plantinga’s first premise (P[S|G] > ½) requires that P[G] = 1—
independently of the value for P[S]. Therefore, Plantinga’s first premise would beg the question 
against de jure arguers.  
 
4.2 Critique of the Wide Scope Reading 
 
On the wide scope reading of the Generalized Reduction Argument, the inference is to 
P[~G] > ½ from P[G→S] > ½ and P[~S] > ½. Again, we can easily demonstrate that this 
inference is invalid. To prove this, we need to show that there are possible values for P[G→S] 
and P[~S] greater than ½ and that are consistent with ~(P[~G] > ½), i.e., consistent with P[G] ≥ 
½. For example, let P[G→S] = 7⁄9 and P[~S] = 11⁄18. Now we can calculate P[G] to prove that it’s 
≥ ½. To do so, we will also need a value for P[~G&S]. It will be consistent with our stipulations 
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as long as it takes a value 0 ≤ P[~G&S] ≤ P[S] and 0 ≤ P[~G&S] ≤ P[~G]. It will do to suppose 
that P[~G&S] = 1⁄9. Now, notice that P[G→S] = P[G ⊃ S] = P[~G v S] = P[~G] + P[S] – 
P[~G&S], which implies that P[~G] = P[G→S] – P[S] + P[~G&S] = 7⁄9 – 7⁄18 + 1⁄9 = ½.  
 
For the same reasons given in the previous subsection, it will not do to fuss with the 
values chosen as counterexamples for the proof. We do not have sufficiently fine-grained 
probabilistic intuitions to differentiate the values chosen for the proof and values required to 
entail the de facto objection that P[~G] > ½. The de jure arguer need not operate on the strong 
Anselmian conception. She need not operate on a modal interpretation of probability. And if she 
does operate on both the modal interpretation and strong Anselmian conception, then Plantinga’s 
premises will beg the question.  However, this last reason holds for a different reason in this 
context than in the previous subsection. To see this, note that Plantinga’s first premise (P[G→S] 
> ½) depends on the value of P[G]: if P[G] = 0, then P[G→S] = P[G ⊃ S] = P[~G v S] = P[~G] + 
P[S] – P[~G&S] = 1 + P[S] – P[S] = 1 > ½; but if P[G] = 1, then P[G→S] = P[G ⊃ S] = P[~G v 
S] = P[~G] + P[S] – P[~G&S] = P[S], which might or might not be > ½. So, on the strong 
Anselmian conception combined with a modal interpretation of probability, whether or not 
Plantinga’s first premise is true depends on whether or not God actually exists. So, it is 
legitimate for the de jure arguer to be neutral about this premise.   
 
4.3 Critique of the Narrow Scope Reading 
 
And we now arrive at the first and most literal reading of the Generalized Reduction 
Argument, which infers ~G from G→(P[S] > ½) and P[~S] > ½. Unfortunately, this 
interpretation is complicated by numerous difficulties, primarily because it mixes graded 
probabilistic judgments concerning S with all-or-nothing alethic judgments about G, and it is 
difficult to know how to relate the two.  
 
For example, in probabilistic contexts, some take absolute assertions as a lazy way of 
expressing maximal probability (certainty). If so, the narrow scope reading of the Bridge Claim 
will be taken to mean (P[G] = 1) →(P[S] > ½), in which case the conclusion of the narrow scope 
reading of the Generalized Reduction Argument (~G) will need to be understood as ~(P[G] = 1). 
Alternatively, in probabilistic contexts, some take absolute assertions as a lazy way of expressing 
that the claim in question is probable. If so, the narrow scope reading of the Bridge Claim will be 
taken to mean (P[G] > ½)→(P[S] > ½), in which case the conclusion of the narrow scope reading 
of the Generalized Reduction Argument will need to be understood as ~( P[G] > ½). However, if 
we interpret the conditional in either of these two ways, the Generalized Reduction Argument is 
automatically ruined because both conclusions (~(P[G] = 1) and ~( P[G] > ½)) are compatible 
with P[G] = ½, which means that the de jure arguer will be consistent in maintaining neutrality 
about G, even while agreeing with the Bridge Claim.  
 
However, it would be a mistake to interpret the antecedent of the narrow scope reading of 
the Bridge Claim probabilistically. Generally speaking, assertions of truth should not be 
reinterpreted probabilistically, since truths do not generally entail their own probabilities: truths 
can be improbable, just as falsehoods can be probable. An exception might be made concerning 
the relation between God’s existence and the probability of his existence, at least when we 
combine a modal understanding of probability with the strong Anselmian conception. As pointed 
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out earlier, combining these two views implies that either P[G] = 1 (if God actually exists) or 
P[G] = 0 (if God actually does not). So, perhaps the above interpretations are permissible in this 
particular case after all. But this leads to a new twist: if the de jure arguer has to maintain ~(P[G] 
= 1) or ~( P[G] > ½), then on the modal understanding of probability combined with the strong 
Anselmian conception, this is tantamount to denying God’s actual existence, thereby vindicating 
the Generalized Reduction Argument. But, again, this sort of reasoning will only convince de 
jure arguers operating on both a strong Anselmian conception and modal understanding of 
probability.  
 
No matter how we interpret the antecedent of the narrow scope reading of the Bridge 
Claim—probabilistically or otherwise—there is a more fundamental problem with the current 
interpretation of it: unlike previous interpretations, the current interpretation does not follow 
from the considerations Plantinga offers in favor of it. Plantinga says that God intended for us to 
know him, instilling in many theists positive epistemic status. This is a relation between G and S, 
not G and P(S). So, Plantinga’s reasons do not directly support G→(P[S] > ½). They at best 
directly support P[S|G] > ½ or P[G→S] > ½—the wide and narrow scope interpretations of the 
Bridge Claim. In order to directly support G→(P[S] > ½), we’d need to argue not just that God 
makes S true but that he makes S probable. It is much less obvious that this is true. Even if we 
grant that God makes S true, it does not automatically follow that he thereby also makes S 
probable, since there are improbable truths. Perhaps God would make an additional effort to 
make S probable. However, on some conceptions of probability—such as probability as a 
measure of logical possibility—probabilities are not things that can be manipulated, even by 
God, supposing that God is bound by logic and necessity. But even if he could make S probable, 
it is not clear that he would. This is especially so on the epistemic interpretation of probability on 
which Plantinga is operating. On that interpretation, God’s desire for S to be probable is the 
desire for us to have positive epistemic status toward S, i.e., the desire for us to have positive 
epistemic status for the belief that theism has positive epistemic status—a second-order 
epistemic status. It is dubious whether God would bother with this second-order epistemic status. 
After all, there must be some positive integer n, such that for all m > n, we do not have mth-order 
positive epistemic status toward theism. Since we know there are such limitations on human 
beings, it follows that God must have stopped somewhere for whatever reason. Perhaps it was at 
n = 1. At any rate, Plantinga has not argued otherwise, and it is difficult to see how a plausible 
argument would go. De jure arguers therefore are free to dismiss the current interpretation of the 
Bridge Claim.   
 
4.4 Plantinga’s Dilemma 
 
This completes our survey of the possible interpretations of the Generalized Reduction 
Argument. We have found each lacking in some significant respect or other, and can sum up by 




P1. The theological considerations offered by Plantinga for relating God’s existence to 




P2. Although Plantinga’s theological considerations plausibly support the wide scope and 
conditionalized readings of the Bridge Claim, probability calculations reveal that the 
corresponding interpretations of the Generalized Reduction Argument are invalid.  
∴ C.  The Generalized Reduction Argument either has a false premise (due to P1) or is 
invalid (due to P2), and is therefore unsound either way. 
 
5.  Actual Proper De jure Objections 
 
So far, I have devoted my efforts to the negative project of casting doubt on the 
Generalized Reduction Argument. I now turn to the positive half of the project, where I discuss 
the construction of actual proper de jure objections. I do not intend here to provide any decisive 
line of argumentation. Instead, my goal is to do some preliminary work for those who do wish to 
carry out such a project. Specifically, I will sketch some strategies for de jure arguers, discuss 
their comparative virtues and vices, and preempt some possible objections. 
 
5.1 A Formal Proper De jure Objection for Factive Positive Epistemic Status 
 
The first type of proper de jure objection is purely formal (in the sense that it can be 
derived purely from logical and probabilistic relations between propositions without added 
substantive philosophical presuppositions). In order to get such an objection, we need to focus on 
factive positive epistemic statuses, such as knowledge and perhaps warrant.26 Let S be any such 
status with respect to G. Since there is a one-directional entailment from S to G, it is plausible 
that P[S] < P[G]. If agnostics avoid either the strong Anselmian conception or a modal 
understanding of probability, so that non-maximal values of P[G] are allowed, and if they can 
argue that in fact P[G] = P[~G] = ½, it follows that P[S] < P[G] = ½, yielding the result that P[S] 
< ½.  
 
To elaborate on the significance of this, let’s distinguish between two types of agnostics. 
First, the equal-weight agnostic about G sees the scale of evidence as equally balanced between 
G and ~G and therefore judges that P[G] = ½. Second, the inscrutability agnostic about G 
reserves judgment about how the evidence comparatively fares, consequently judges P[G] to be 
inscrutable, and therefore takes no attitude toward its value. Now, it strikes me as immediately 
intuitive that for agnostics of both types, agnosticism is also the proper default stance toward any 
claim to factive positive epistemic status with respect to G. That is, in either case, they should be 
neutral about claims to factive positive epistemic status toward G—without special reason to 
push them to one side or the other. However, since equal-weight agnostics about G have the 
above argument for P[S] < ½, it turns out rather surprisingly that their proper default stance 
toward factive positive epistemic status is disbelief. Since P[S] < ½ does not follow for 
inscrutability agnostics about G, their proper default stance toward factive positive epistemic 
status remains agnosticism. This yields a surprising discrepancy between the two types of 
agnostics.27  
 
5.2 A Plantingan Proper De jure Objection for Knowledge and Warrant 
 
If we do not simply rely on the factivity of a given positive epistemic status, we can no 
longer derive formal proper de jure objections. We shall have to bring in more substantive 
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philosophical claims. Interestingly, there are significant prospects for doing so on Plantingan 
grounds.  
 
Suppose equal-weight agnostics can plausibly establish that P[G] = P[~G] = ½. Let W be 
the proposition that theism is warranted for some specific group of people. Then P[W] = 
P[W|G]P[G] + P[W|~G]P[~G] = ½P[W|G] + ½P[W|~G], which is < ½ when P[W|G] + P[W|~G] 
< 1, i.e., when P[W|G] < 1 – P[W|~G]. So, if agnostics can defend this inequality, they have a 
proper de jure objection. They can make use of the fact that many atheists, agnostics, and even 
theists (including Plantinga himself), agree that P[W|~G] is nearly zero.28 They would just need 
to argue that it is sufficiently low, viz., closer to zero than P[W|G] is to 1. In other words, they’d 
need to argue that W is somewhat more certain that W is false under ~G than that W is true 
under G.  
 
But how could this be done? Well, here’s a suggestion. Agnostics might argue that, while 
it is fairly clear that the sort of God under discussion would want W to be true for the target 
group of people, this nevertheless remains far from certain due to the existence of various 
significant doubts (including the fact that God and his desires would be quite complex and 
largely obscure to mere humans, not to mention the possibility that faith and free will conflict 
with theistic warrant). So, the doubts here are non-negligible. But on the other side, there aren’t 
any comparable doubts for the claim that theism would be unwarranted if there’s no God. In fact, 
not only are the reasons for attributing warrant to theism absent if God does not exist, but there 
are also strong positive reasons to think theism couldn’t have such a status. Agnostics could here 
appeal to Plantinga’s (in)famous evolutionary argument against naturalism to argue that if God 
doesn’t exist there couldn’t be warrant for any proposition at all, much less for something like 
theism.29 Of course, most agnostics will not want to go this route because it, in conjunction with 
agnosticism, would entail that agnostics have no warrant for any of their own beliefs. But 
perhaps that’s not so worrisome, as long as agnostics could continue to reasonably claim some 
other (non-factive) positive epistemic status (e.g., justification or rationality) toward the 
propositions they accept.  
 
So, pending further work, it might turn out that agnostics have a plausible case for the 
conclusion that there are more doubts about W under G than there are about ~W under ~G. If so, 
then they can plausibly conclude that P[W|G] < 1 – P[W|~G] and therefore that P[W] < ½, even 
though P[G] = P[~G] = ½. The objection carries over to knowledge as well, since knowledge 
requires warrant.  
 
5.3 G-S Independent Proper De jure Objections 
 
Formal and Plantingan proper de jure objections unfortunately possess a certain 
weakness. Let’s distinguish between two types of proper de jure objection: 
 
G-S Dependent Objections: Proper de jure objections that derive from some claim 
about the relationship between G and S.  
 
G-S Independent Objections: Proper de jure objections that do not derive from any 




The formal and Plantingan proper de jure objections are G-S dependent because they rely on 
claims about how God’s existence bears on positive epistemic status for theism—claims 
mathematically represented  by the inequalities P[S] < P[G] and P[S|G] < 1 – P[S|~G]. But the 
problem with these inequalities is that they are weak. They are weak in the sense that they 
become dubious once “<” is replaced by “<<.”  So, although they would suffice to establish that 
P[S] < ½, they would not suffice to establish that P[S] << ½. And I do not know of any clear G-S 
dependent objections that would allow us to convincingly establish that P[S] << ½. Moreover, 
there is some room to argue that if P[S] < ½ but ~(P[S] << ½), then this at best supports 
suspension of judgment rather than disbelief in the claim that theism has positive epistemic 
status, and therefore does not qualify as a proper de jure objection. In my own view, P[S] < ½ 
suffices for disbelief. But I do not wish to argue that here. So, for those who think that P[S] < ½ 
is insufficient to license disbelief, I recommend G-S independent de jure objections, which have 
the potential to bypass the problem.  
 
 In order to present a G-S independent objection, one needs to set aside whether God 
exists and whatever implications his existence might have for positive epistemic status, instead 
focusing exclusively on direct doubts about positive epistemic status. There is a wide array of 
possibilities here. First, there are objections of the traditional type, where one argues that theism 
is unjustified or irrational or unreasonable or that no one could possibly know such a thing. But 
there are also approaches that remain relatively unexplored. For example, there are some 
prospects for an improper basing objection: even if there are sufficiently good reasons for 
theism, most people do not actually form their theistic beliefs on the basis of those reasons but 
instead do so on the basis of wishful thinking, poor reasoning, a stubborn commitment to 
tradition, or the like. Alternatively, one might argue that even if theism is likely justified, 
rational, reasonable, and even true, it is Gettiered or “lotteried” or involves some other such 
epistemic accident or poor epistemic luck. It is easy to see why one might think theism faces the 
lottery problem: the problem of religious diversity. Any particular brand of exclusive 
monotheistic belief asserts but one of many possible gods and religious beliefs that have equal 
but competing chances of being right. It is not quite so easy to see why one might think theistic 
belief is Gettiered. It is probably most plausible in the case of theistic belief based on religious 
experience. De jure objectors have sometimes claimed that religious experience is the result of 
hallucination, misperception, misinterpreted perception, or the like. One response sometimes 
given to this sort of objection is that such mechanisms could be the means by which God reveals 
his presence. Perhaps de jure objectors could argue that this gives theistic belief the structure of 
Gettier’s original cases. Of course, perhaps there are other, non-deviant mechanisms by which 
God experientially reveals his presence. But if the de jure arguer can come up with grounds for 
thinking that at the very least the deviant mechanisms are most common, it is perhaps possible to 
liken the non-deviant cases to seeing a real barn in fake-barn country.  
 
 Even if one or more of these suggestions is prima facie plausible, they face one last 
potential difficulty that stands out for all G-S independent objections. Remember that my earlier 
discussion of Plantinga did not decisively refute his Generalized Reduction Argument on any 
interpretation. It simply showed that on no interpretation is it sound given some plausible 
probability assignments. Other possible probability assignments would work. So, what I’ve 
shown is merely that the Generalized Reduction Argument cannot be relied on without further 
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information that would be difficult to acquire. G-S dependent objections have an advantage here, 
since they make claims about the G-S relationship and therefore at least have the potential to 
refute the Generalized Reduction Argument (on some or all interpretations). G-S independent 
objections are at a disadvantage here, since by definition they have no such potential. Instead, 
their strategy must be to deny that the Generalized Reduction Argument is conclusive (due to the 
worries from my earlier discussion), leave open that it could turn out to be sound for reasons we 
do not now have, and argue that until we acquire such reasons it is legitimate to ignore the 
Generalized Reduction Argument and tentatively proceed with de jure objections. 
 
 One potential problem here is that theists might object that this strategy yields de jure 
objections that do not count as “proper” if the Generalized Reduction Argument is in fact sound 
on some interpretation—whether or not we know it to be. The question this raises is about how 
we are to understand the term “proper.” There are two possible interpretations: 
 
Strongly proper: A de jure objection is strongly proper if as a matter of fact it does not 
entail (or make probable) the de facto objection. 
 
Weakly proper: A de jure objection is weakly proper if we do not have good reason to 
infer from it the de facto objection.    
 
Given my worries about the Generalized Reduction Argument, it is clear that even G-S 
independent objections can be weakly proper. It is possible but still questionable whether or not 
they are also strongly proper. They are perhaps both weakly and strongly proper. But at the very 
least, we can rest assured that they are proper in some important sense.   
 
6. Where This Leaves Us 
 
 It looks like there is little hope for theists to simplify the defense of their position from de 
jure objections by appeal to the claim that such objections are improper. It is clear that some 
such objections are at least weakly proper, are potentially strongly proper, and the prospects for 
establishing that they are not strongly proper are dim. This does not mean that theism is refuted. 
What it means is that theists must deal with each de jure objection one at a time, and 
independently of the de facto objection. There is no quick and easy path to circumvent this 
challenge. Perhaps as somewhat of a consolation, it also means that atheists do not have a quick 
and easy path to win over agnostics. Were there to be a convincing reduction of de jure 
objections to de facto objections, agnostics already convinced of a de jure objection would then 
have a reason to infer a de facto objection and convert to atheism. Given that there is no such 
reduction, agnostics can rest safe and secure in the blanket of their preferred proper de jure 





Adams, Ernest W. 1975. The Logic of Conditionals. Dordrecht: Reidel.  
16 
 
Adams, Ernest W. 1981. “Truth, Proof, and Conditionals.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 62: 
323-339.  
Baker, Deane-Peter. 2005. “Plantinga’s Reformed Epistemology: What’s the Question?” 
International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion 57: 77-103.   
Beilby, James. 2007. “Plantinga’s Model of Warranted Christian Belief.” In Alvin Plantinga, 
edited by D.-P. Baker. New York: Cambridge UP, 125-165. 
Beilby, James K., ed. 2002. Naturalism Defeated? Essays on Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument 
against Naturalism. Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP. 
Bennett, Jonathan. 2003. A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals. New York: Oxford UP. 
Carlstrom, Ian F., and Christopher S. Hill. 1978. "Review of Adams's The Logic of 
Conditionals." Philosophy of Science 45: 155-158.   
Clark, Kelly James. 2007. "Pluralism and Proper Function." In Alvin Plantinga, edited by D.-P. 
Baker. New York: Cambridge UP, 166-187. 
Coffman, E. J. 2008. "Warrant Without Truth?" Synthese 162 (2): 173-194. 
Edgington, Dorothy. 1986. "Do Conditionals Have Truth Conditions?" Critica 18 (52): 3-39. 
Feldman, Richard. 2003. "Plantinga on Exclusivism." Faith and Philosophy 20 (1): 85-90.  
Findlay, J. N. 1948. "Can God's Existence Be Disproved?" Mind 57 (226): 176-183. 
Fitelson, Branden, and Elliott Sober. 1998. "Plantinga's Evolutionary Arguments against 
Evolutionary Naturalism." Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79: 115-129. 
Gale, Richard M. 2001. "Alvin Plantinga's Warranted Christian Belief." Philo 4 (2): 138-147.   
Gale, Richard M. 2007. "Evil and Alvin Plantinga." In Alvin Plantinga, edited by D.-P. Baker. 
New York: Cambridge UP, 48-70. 
Grice, H.P. 1967a. "Logic and Conversation." In his Studies in the Way of Words. Cambridge, 
Mass." Harvard UP, 22-40.  
Grice, H.P. 1967b. "Indicative Conditionals." In his Studies in the Way of Words. Cambridge, 
Mass." Harvard UP, 58-87.  
Hajek, Alan. 1989. "Probabilities of Conditionals—Revisited." Journal of Philosophical Logic 
18: 423-428.  
Hajek, Alan. 1994. "Triviality on the Cheap?" In Probability and Conditionals: Belief Revision 
and Rational Decision, edited by E. Fells and B. Skyrms. New York: Cambridge UP, 113-
140.   
17 
 
Hajek, Alan. 2003. "What Conditional Probability Could Not Be." Synthese 137 (3): 273-323.  
Howard-Snyder, Daniel, Frances Howard-Snyder, and Neil Feit. 2007. "Infallibilism and 
Gettier's Legacy." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2): 304-327. 
Huemer, Michael. 2005. "Logical Properties of Warrant." Philosophical Studies 122 (2): 171-
182. 
Jackson, Frank. 1987. Conditionals. Oxford: Blackwell.   
Kvanvig, Jonathan. 2007. "Two Approaches to Epistemic Defeat." In Alvin Plantinga, edited by 
D.-P. Baker. New York: Cambridge UP, 107-124. 
Leftow, Brian. 2010. "Necessity." In The Cambridge Companion to Christian Philosophical 
Theology, edited by C. Taliaferro and C. Meister. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 
15-30. 
Lewis, David. 1976. "Probability of Conditionals and Conditional Probability." In his 
Philosophical Papers, vol. 2. New York: Oxford UP, 133-152.  
Long, Todd R. 2010. "A Proper De jure Objection to the Epistemic Rationality of Religious 
Belief." Religious Studies 46: 375-394. 
Lycan, William G. 2001. Real Conditionals. New York: Oxford UP.  
Mellor, D.H. 2005. Probability: A Philosophical Introduction. New York: Routledge.  
Merricks, Trenton. 1995. "Warrant Entails Truth." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 
55 (4): 841-855. 
Merricks, Trenton. 1997. "More on Warrant's Entailing Truth." Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 57 (3): 627-631. 
Moon, Andrew. 2012. "Warrant Does Entail Truth." Synthese 184 (3): 287-297. 
Morris, Thomas V. 1991. "The Concept of God." In Our Idea of God: An Introduction to 
Philosophical Theology. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 27-46. 
Plantinga, Alvin. 1974. The Nature of Necessity. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
Plantinga, Alvin. 1993a. Warrant and Proper Function. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Plantinga, Alvin. 1993b. Warrant: The Current Debate. Oxford: Oxford UP. 
Plantinga, Alvin. 1997. "Warrant and Accidentally True Belief." Analysis 57 (2): 140-145. 
Plantinga, Alvin. 2000. Warranted Christian Belief. New York: Oxford UP. 
18 
 
Ramsey, Frank P. 1929. "Law and Causality." Reprinted in Foundations: Essays in Philosophy, 
Logic, Mathematics, and Economics, edited by D.H. Mellor. London: Routledge, 128-151.  
Ryan, Sharon. 1996. "Does Warrant Entail Truth?" Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 
56 (1): 183-192. 
Sennett, James F. 1994. "Is God Essentially God?" Religious Studies 30 (3): 295-303.  
Senor, Thomas D. 2002. "A Critical Review of Alvin Plantinga's Warranted Christian Belief." 
International Philosophical Quarterly 42 (3): 389-396.  
Sosa, Ernest. 2007. "Natural Theology and Natural Atheology: Plantinga's Evolutionary 
Argument Against Naturalism." In Alvin Plantinga, edited by D.-P. Baker. New York: 
Cambridge UP, 93-106. 
Stalnaker, Robert C. 1970. "Probability and Conditionals." Reprinted in Ifs: Conditionals, Belief, 
Decision, Chance, and Time, vol. 15, edited by W. Harper, G.A. Pearce, and Robert 
Stalnaker, 2012. Springer Science and Business Media, 107-128.  
Stalnaker, Robert C. 1976. "Letter to van Fraassen." In Foundations of Probability Theory, 
Statistical Inference, and Statistical Theories of Science, vol. 1, edited by W. Harper and C. 
Hooker. Dordrecht: Reidel, 302-306.  
Swinburne, Richard. 2001. "Plantinga on Warrant." Religious Studies 37 (2): 203-214.  
Wykstra, Stephen J. 2002. "Not Done in a Corner: How to Be a Sensible Evidentialist about 
Jesus." Philosophical Books 43: 81-135.  
Zagzebski, Linda. 1994. "The Inescapability of Gettier Problems." The Philosophical Quarterly 




1 This paper is currently under review at Religious Studies.  
2 I borrow the terms “de facto” and “de jure” from Plantinga (2000: ix).  
3 Roughly, “a belief has warrant for a person S only if that belief is produced in S by cognitive faculties properly 
(subject to no dysfunction) in a cognitive environment that is appropriate for S’s kind of cognitive faculties, 
according to a design plan that is successfully aimed at truth” (156). But note that Plantinga proceeds to modify this 
in rather complex ways.  
4 According to the developed version of this model, human beings are made in God’s image, which includes being 
instilled with special cognitive faculties—namely a sensus divinitatis (sense of divinity) and the “internal instigation 
of the Holy Spirit”—which, when functioning properly (i.e., as God designed) (and it might not due to sin), reveals 
to our intellects the existence of God (and other essential truths of Christianity) and “seals them upon our hearts.” 
Christian belief is therefore “basic” (produced innately, not deliberately by inference or argument), and, given 
Plantinga’s epistemology, is “properly” so (i.e., justified, rational, and warranted).  
5 Todd Long (2010).  
6 Wykstra (2002), Senor (2002), and Swinburne (2001).   
7 See Baker (2005) for a critical overview of a good range of such objections. 
8 Beilby (2007), Clark (2007), Feldman (2003), Gale (2001), Gale (2007), and Kvanvig (2007). 
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9 One might understand positive epistemic status as a specific positive epistemic status, such as rationality, 
justification, warrant, or knowledge. Another option is to interpret it as an all-things-considered epistemic 
evaluation. 
10 Long (2010). 
11 Plantinga would presumably prefer this adjustment himself, since he holds that a proposition being more probable 
than not is an insufficient standard for belief (WCB, 271, n. 56).  
12 For a good explication and defense of this conception over others, I recommend Morris (1991).  
13 See Plantinga (1974: 214-215), where he adopts the argument of J.N. Findlay (1948: 108-118). For further 
defense of the idea that perfection requires necessary existence, see Brian Leftow (2010). And for some reasons to 
contest that perfection requires possessing the various perfections essentially, see James Sennett (1994).  
14 For a good, introductory overview of the philosophy of probability and the standard probability calculus, I highly 
recommend Mellor’s book (2005).  
15 If, for example, Q follows from P only via a complex deductive chain that I am not currently capable of seeing, 
there is some sense in which I am internally consistent in simultaneously accepting P but denying Q. 
16 I borrow the name given to it by Hajek (2003: 273). 
17 Plantinga presumably would only accept the Ratio Formula as an idealization when it comes to epistemic 
conditional probability, since in earlier work he gives his own alternative account of non-idealized epistemic 
conditional probability (1993a: Chapter 9). See the next endnote.    
18 Although Plantinga gives an analysis of conditional probability, it is not a function with absolute probabilities as 
inputs. Here is his “first approximation” (for which he later makes some qualifications): “P(A/B) = <x,y> iff <x,y> is 
the smallest interval which contains all the intervals which represent the degree to which a rational human being S 
(for whom the conditions necessary for warrant hold) could believe A if she believed B, had no undercutting defeater 
for A, had no other source of warrant for either A or for –A, was aware that she believed B, and considered the 
evidential bearing of B on A” (1993a: 168).  
19 I borrow the name from Bennett (2003: 20). Note that this is a weak version of the analysis in the sense that it 
only goes so far as to say that the material and indicative conditionals have identical truth conditions. A stronger 
version would go further by claiming that they have the same meaning. I will be neutral about the stronger version 
here, since it is irrelevant to anything I will say in this paper.   
20 I am convinced by Jackson’s argument from the “or-to-if” inference (1987: 4-6), and other similar arguments, and 
think the responses to it are problematic. But when it comes to explaining away the apparent counterexamples to the 
Horseshoe Analysis currently available in the literature, all that is available is the Gricean defense from 
conversational implicature (1967a and 1967b) and the Jacksonian defense from conventional implicature (1987). My 
own defense departs from the implicature route altogether and is planned as the subject of a future paper.   
21 “The Formalized Ramsey Thesis” is my own name for a proposal about how to formalize a claim that is 
sometimes called “the Ramsey Test” or “Ramsey Thesis” or “Ramsey Test Thesis,” after its author, Frank Ramsey, 
in a much-discussed footnote (1929: 143): “If two people are arguing ‘If A will C?’ and are both in doubt as to A, 
they are adding A hypothetically to their stock of knowledge and arguing on that basis about C … We can say they 
are fixing their degrees of belief in C given A.” Others have called the proposed formalization “Stalnaker’s 
Hypothesis” (owing to Stalnaker’s 1970 discussion of it, though he was not the first to do so) or “the Equation” 
(Edgington 1986).    
22 I borrow the name for Adams’s theory from Lycan (2001: 49).  
23 But we can easily see that there is no such collapse if we accept the Horseshoe Analysis and Ratio Formula. First, 
when P[x] = 0, P[x→y] remains defined, whereas P[y|x] does not. But even when P[x] ≠ 0 and P[y|x] is defined, the 
conditional probability is not generally the same as the probability of the corresponding conditional. As can easily 
be proven, the relationship between the two probabilities is this: P[x→y] = 1-P[x]+P[x]P[y|x] (when P[x] ≠ 0), from 
which it follows that the two probabilities are equal just in case P[y|x] = 1, which is the trivial case in which x makes 
y maximally probable or y is already maximally probable and x has no effect on it.  
24 By “modal understanding of probability,” I mean an understanding where (a) the probability of a proposition 
measures the degree to which the proposition is possible (whether the modality is understood physically, 
metaphysically, logically, or epistemically) and (b) “necessary” in “necessary proposition” expresses the same type 
of modality as is measured by the probability. Given this type of probability, it follows that any necessary 
proposition receives maximal probability (i.e., probability 1) and any impossible proposition receives minimal 
probability (i.e., probability 0).    
25 Thanks to Edward Wierenga for this objection.  
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26 Many have argued that warrant indeed entails truth, e.g., Zagzebski (1994), Merricks (1995 and 1997), and 
Plantinga (1997). For opposing views, see Ryan (1996), Huemer (2005), Coffman (2008), D. Howard-Snyder et al. 
(2007), and Moon (2012). 
27 In fact, this generalizes. For any proposition Q, if P[Q] = ½, then P[SQ] < ½, where SQ is the proposition that Q 
has some factive positive epistemic status (unless there is perhaps some strange Q such that Q also entails SQ). So, 
the proper default stance toward SQ is disbelief for equal-weight agnostics about Q but agnosticism for inscrutability 
agnostics about Q.    
28 At least, for some such instances of S, such as theistic knowledge or warrant.  
29  Plantinga (1993: Chapter 12), Plantinga (2000: 227-240), Fitelson and Sober (1998), Beilby (2002), and Sosa 
(2007). 
30 I am grateful to Edward Wierenga for his fascinating philosophical theology seminar on Plantinga’s Warranted 
Christian Belief at the University of Rochester several years ago, during which I developed the foundational ideas of 
this paper. I am also grateful for his penetrating critique of the initial, rudimentary version of my central argument, 
the response to which required me to navigate through a vast philosophical terrain, ultimately yielding the more 
subtle line of thinking presented here.  
